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I. EXTRACONTRACTUAL LIABILITY
A. No TORT LIABILITY FOR INSURER'S PAYMENT OF ALLEGEDLY
INVALID WORKERS COMPENSATION CLAIMS
N Wayne Duddlesten, Inc. v. Highland Insurance Co., the First Dis-
trict Court of Appeals refused to recognize causes of action by an
employer against its workers compensation carrier for breach of fidu-
ciary duty and negligence arising from the carrier's payment of allegedly
invalid workers compensation claims.' The insured employer obtained
workers' compensation insurance from the same workers compensation
carrier for three consecutive years beginning July 1, 1991. These policies
were subject to a "retrospective premium payment," pursuant to which a
standard annual premium amount was adjusted according to the amount
of claims paid under the policies.2 The employer complained that the
carrier inappropriately paid a number of claims that should have been
contested, thereby unnecessarily increasing its premiums. The employer
asserted numerous causes of action, including breach of fiduciary duty
and negligence. The court rejected all of the employer's liability theories,
but of particular interest was the court's treatment of the fiduciary duty
and negligence causes of action.
1. No Fiduciary Duty
The court held that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment
on the pleadings with respect to the breach of fiduciary duty cause of
action. The court noted that "there is no general fiduciary duty between
1. Wayne Duddlesten, Inc. v. Highland Ins. Co., 110 S.W.3d 85, 97 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. denied).
2. Id. at 88-89.
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an insurer and its insured."'3 The employer failed to plead facts demon-
strating that an informal, confidential relationship existed between the
employer and the insurer prior to and apart from the insurance contracts.
Mere allegations that the employer "trusted the insurer to correctly ad-
minister its workers' compensation claims" was insufficient to support the
existence of an informal fiduciary duty.4
2. No Cause of Action for Negligent Claims Handling
The employer claimed that its insurer was negligent in settling, rather
than contesting, allegedly invalid workers' compensation claims. As a re-
sult of this alleged negligence, the employer was subject to higher premi-
ums under a retrospective premium payment plan. The employer further
contended that, because the insurer would get paid more premiums under
the retrospective premium plan, it "had less of an incentive to dispute
invalid claims."' 5 The employer argued that the Texas Supreme Court's
decision in Ranger County Mutual Insurance Co. v. Guin6 extended the
Stowers duty to the claims handling process. "The court in Ranger stated
that an insurer's duty.. . 'extends to the full range of the agency relation-
ship,' and includes the investigation [of claims] and the defense of...
lawsuits." 7 However, the Duddlesten court determined that this case was
distinguishable from Ranger because Ranger involved the insurer's negli-
gent failure to settle cases within policy limits. Here, the employer's com-
plaint was based on the insurer's decision to settle claims, rather than the
failure to settle as in Ranger. The court concluded that Texas law does
not permit claims against "insurers, outside the scope of Stowers, for the
negligent handling of claims."' 8
B. 5TH CIRCUIT EXTENDS DUTY OF GOOD FAITH TO D&O
LIABILITY POLICY
In Medical Care America, Inc. v. National Union Fire Insurance Co. of
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania,9 shareholders of Medical Care America, Inc.
("Medical Care") brought securities claims against the directors and of-
ficers ("D&O") of Medical Care for alleged misrepresentation and mate-
rial nondisclosures in connection with a merger which resulted in a
decline in stock value. Medical Care obtained a D&O liability policy
which provided coverage beginning the date of the merger. Medical Care
sought indemnification under the D&O policy for amounts paid to settle
the claims against its directors and officers, but coverage was denied.
Medical Care sued alleging, among other things, breach of contract and
3. Id. at 96.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 97.
6. Ranger County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Guin, 723 S.W.2d 656, 659 (Tex. 1987).
7. Duddlesten, 110 S.W.3d at 97 (quoting Ranger, 723 S.W.2d at 659).
8. Id.




The coverage provided under the D&O policy was limited to "[l]oss
arising from claims for alleged Wrongful Acts occurring on or after [the
date of the merger]."" a The policy provided that losses "arising out of the
same or related Wrongful Act(s) shall be deemed to arise from the first
such same or related Wrongful Act."1 2 The coverage question at issue
was whether the policy covered the directors and officers post merger
wrongful acts that were the same or related to their pre-merger wrongful
acts. A jury determined that the claims against the directors and officers
were not covered by the policy. Medical Care appealed. 13
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court's judgment on the verdict,
finding that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict.
What is significant about this case is the court's analysis of Medical Care's
bad faith claim. Citing Maryland Insurance Co. v. Head Industrial Coat-
ings & Services, Inc.,14 the court recognized that, under Texas law, an
insurer is not liable for bad faith premised on the insurer's investigation
or defense of a claim brought against the insured by a third party since
the insured is fully protected by his contractual and Stowers rights. How-
ever, although the D&O policy provided liability coverage for losses re-
sulting from claims brought by third parties, the court treated Medical
Care's claim as a first party claim to which the duty of good faith and fair
dealing applies. The court stated:
In this case, Medical Care does not allege that National Union acted
in bad faith in investigating or defending the shareholders' claims of
loss. Indeed, it admits that National Union had no duty to defend
the shareholder suit. Medical Care alleges instead that National
Union acted in bad faith in handling its own claim of loss (i.e., reim-
bursement of its indemnification of the $10 million allocated to its
directors and officers following the settlement of the shareholder
suit). Its allegation concerns the relationship between it and Na-
tional Union-not between National Union and the shareholders.
Thus, we will treat Medical Care's claim as a first-party claim to
which the duty of good faith applies. 15
The court ultimately determined that Medical Care's bad faith claim was
invalid because "the evidence overwhelmingly shows that there was a
bona fide coverage dispute, which National Union subsequently won."'16
However, the court's analysis of the issue may signal an effort to limit the
applicability of the Texas Supreme Court's holding in the Head case.
10. Id. at 417-19.
11. Id. at 419 (quoting Endorsement *7 of the D&O Liability Policy).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 420.
14. Md. Ins. Co. v. Head Indus. Coatings & Servs., Inc., 938 S.W.2d 27, 27 (Tex. 1996).
15. Med. Care Am., Inc., at 425.
16. Id. at 426.
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C. EFFECT OF RELEASE OF CONTRACTUAL CLAIMS FOR COVERAGE
ON EXTRACONTRACTUAL CLAIMS
In Vaughan v. Hartford Casualty Insurance Co.,17 the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Texas provided a reminder of
the importance of paying attention to detail when drafting settlement
documents in coverage disputes. In this case, Vaughan was injured in an
automobile accident in July of 2000. The driver of the other vehicle was
at fault, but only had $20,000 in liability coverage. Vaughan notified
Hartford, the uninsured motorist carrier for the car in which he was a
passenger, of the accident and his injuries in October of 2000 and again in
November of 2000.18 On or about March 21, 2002, Vaughan reached an
agreement with Hartford to settle the uninsured/underinsured motorist
claim for $200,000.19 Hartford sent Vaughan a release that Vaughan re-
turned, adding language specifically stating that he was not releasing any
claims for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, violation of
Insurance Code Article 21.21, and of Article 21.55. Hartford rejected
Vaughan's revisions to the release.20 On April 4, 2002, Vaughan signed a
release containing the original language proposed by Hartford, which re-
leased Hartford
from any and all claim, demands and causes of action, of whatever
nature, whether in contract or in tort, for bodily injury and property
damage which have accrued or may ever accrue to me... for and on
account of the incident/auto accident which occurred on or about July
8, 2000, involving the [Escalade].21
The release further stated that the $200,000 of consideration "is accepted
by [Vaughan] in full compromise and settlement of all claims and causes
of action being asserted by me or which might have been asserted by me,
whether for property damages, personal injury or other loss or damage,
and said claim shall be dismissed with prejudice. '2 2 Lastly, the release
"acknowledge [s] full satisfaction and discharge of all claims and demands
against [Hartford] under the [UMIUIM Coverage] attached to [the
Policy]. " 23
Subsequent to the execution of the release, Vaughan sued Hartford for
breach of the common-law duty of good faith and fair dealing, as well as
violations of Insurance Code Article 21.21, § 4(10) and Insurance Code
article 21.55.24 The threshold issue in this appeal was whether the scope
of the release precluded Vaughan from asserting extracontractual claims
against Hartford. The court noted that, generally, "an insured may not
prevail on [extracontractual] claim[s] without first showing that the in-
17. Vaughan v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 277 F. Supp. 2d 682 (N.D. Tex. 2003).
18. Id. at 683.
19. Id. at 686.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 688 (quoting App. to Mot. at 47-48) (emphasis in original).
22. Id. (quoting App. to Mot. at 48).
23. Id. (quoting App. to Mot. at 48) (emphasis in original).
24. Id. at 683.
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surer breached [its] contract. '25 Vaughan could not establish breach of
contract because the release discharged this claim. However, the court
stated that because of the independent nature of the tort and contract
claims, in some cases an insured can succeed on its bad faith tort claim
despite its failure demonstrate a breach of the insurance contract.
26
1. Release of Contractual Claims Did Not Bar Common Law Bad
Faith and D TPA Claims
The release did not specifically include extracontractual claims. As a
result, the court held that the scope of the release did not preclude
Vaughan from bringing his claims for bad faith and violations of the
DTPA. Hartford argued that the fact that Vaughan signed the release
after Hartford had rejected Vaughan's attempt to expressly reserve his
extracontractual claims from the release was evidence that the parties in-
tended for the extracontractual claims to be included within the scope of
the release. However, the court noted that Vaughan may have signed the
release because he determined that the scope of the release was suffi-
ciently narrow that it was unnecessary to expressly reserve the extracon-
tractual claims. Thus, Vaughan was not precluded by the release from
asserting his bad faith and DTPA claims since these claims were of a dif-
ferent nature than the released contract claim.27
2. Article 21.55 Claim Was Precluded by Release of Contract Claim
The court took a different view concerning Vaughan's claims under Ar-
ticle 21.55 of the Texas Insurance Code. The court recognized that Arti-
cle 21.55 defines the obligations of an insurer "under an insurance
policy[,] extends the rights of an insured under [the policy, and] is limited
to 'a first party claim made by an insured or a policyholder under an
insurance policy or contract or by a beneficiary named in the policy or
contract that must be paid by the insurer directly to the insured or benefi-
ciary."' 28 Thus, the court concluded that Vaughan's Article 21.55 claim
was discharged by the release, since the release was in full satisfaction
and discharge of all claims under the policy. 29
3. Release of Contractual Claim did not Necessarily Preclude Article
21.21 Claim
The court did not reach a conclusion as to whether Vaughan's Article
21.21 claim was discharged by the release; however, the court recognized
that there might be the basis for an argument that the Article 21.21 claim
should be treated in the same manner as the common law bad faith and




28. Id. (quoting TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.55, § 1(3) (Vernon Supp. 2003)).
29. Id. (quoting App. to Mot. at 48).
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DTPA claims. The court determined that it need not decide this issue
because Vaughan had failed to establish any damages beyond those dam-
ages that were released. As a result, the court ultimately determined that
Vaughan's bad faith, DTPA, and Article 21.21 claims could not be
sustained.30
Although the court ultimately resolved this dispute in favor of the in-
surer, the court's analysis demonstrates that insurers seeking to discharge
both contract and tort claims when resolving disputed claims should en-
sure that their settlement documentation specifically release both con-
tractual and extracontractual claims.
D. DUTY TO INVESTIGATE, NEGOTIATE AND SETTLE CLAIMS LIMITED
TO STOWERS DUTY
In Gulf Insurance Co. v. Jones,3 1 the Northern District of Texas ad-
dressed the extent of an insurer's duty to investigate, negotiate, and settle
third party liability claims against its insured. Donald R. Blum ("Blum")
was a podiatrist who had obtained a professional liability policy from the
Fidelity and Casualty Company of New York, which was reinsured by
Gulf Insurance Company (collectively "Gulf"). Sonia Jones sued Blum
for medical malpractice based on events that occurred during the effec-
tive dates of the policy. Gulf defended Blum. The case was tried in Feb-
ruary of 1999, resulting in a $2,125,000 verdict, later lowered by remittitur
to $1,100,000, plus prejudgment and postjudgment interest. Gulf agreed
to indemnify Blum for the judgment, but only up to the "per person"
liability limit of $500,000. Gulf filed a declaratory judgment action seek-
ing a determination that it was not obligated to indemnify Blum in excess
of the $500,000 per person liability limit and that it had no extracontrac-
tual liability for its handling of the claim. Blum counterclaimed for
breach of contract, violations of the Texas Insurance Code, and
negligence. 32
After determining that Gulf was not contractually obligated to indem-
nify Blum beyond the $500,000 per person liability limit, the court ad-
dressed Blum's extracontractual claims. Blum complained that Gulf
failed to investigate, negotiate, and settle Jones's claim. As a threshold
matter, the court held that while the insurance contract gave Gulf the
right to investigate, negotiate and settle any suit or claim Gulf believed
appropriate, the contract did not impose a corresponding contractual
duty on Gulf.33
30. Id. at 690.
31. Gulf Ins. Co. v. Jones, No. CIV.A.300CV0330L, 2003 WL 22208551 (N.D. Tex.
Sept. 24, 2003).
32. Id. at *1.
33. Id. at *34.
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1. No Stowers Duty to Negotiate
Blum asserted that Gulf acted negligently by refusing to negotiate and
settle Jones's claim. The court noted that there was a pretrial settlement
demand of $500,000; however, the court pointed out that Blum was ada-
mant that he did not want to settle the lawsuit and that he communicated
this to Gulf. Despite Blum's opposition to settlement, Blum argued that
his consent to settlement was not required under the policy and blamed
Gulf's insurance adjuster for failing to settle the lawsuit. First, he claimed
that the adjuster failed to appreciate the weakness in his defense; how-
ever, the court pointed out that the record demonstrated the adjuster
considered the evidence in the case and that Blum himself testified in his
deposition that it was reasonable for the insurer to believe that the claim
was defensible. Blum further complained that the adjuster did not ac-
tively attempt to settle the case, but the court stated that an insurer has
no Stowers duty to make or solicit settlement offers. 34 Second, he blamed
the adjuster for allegedly hiring an inexperienced attorney. Although,
Blum admitted he was satisfied with his defense, he claimed that, but for
defense counsel's inexperience, he might have been convinced to settle
the lawsuit. The court rejected this argument completely, recognizing
that an insurer is not vicariously liable for the conduct of defense counsel
and, thus, could not support a Stowers claim based on defense counsel's
alleged conduct. 35
2. Duty Under Article 21.21 is the Same As Stowers
Blum contended that Gulf's failure to negotiate and settle Jones' claim
was a violation of Article 21.21. Gulf countered that Blum was not enti-
tled to assert a cause of action under 21.21 in light of the Texas Supreme
Court's holding in Head "that the insured's rights against its insurer re-
garding the insurer's settlement practices were limited to the rights under
the Stowers doctrine. '36 The court responded that "Head, however, is not
[sic] longer applicable. ' 37 This broad statement should be viewed in con-
text, as the court was addressing the viability of an Article 21.21 cause of
action. The court pointed out that the statute has been amended subse-
quent to the Head decision and now "permits an insured to bring a cause
of action against an insurer for unfair settlement practices." 38 Citing the
Texas Supreme Court decision in Rocor International Inc. v. National
Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania,39 the court recog-
nized that the elements necessary to establish liability under Article 21.21
34. Id. at *4 (citing Am. Physicians Ins. Exch. v. Garcia, 876 S.W.2d. 842, 851 (Tex.
1994)).
35. Id. at *4.




39. Rocor Int'l Inc. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 77 S.W.3d 253, 262 (Tex. 2002).
[Vol. 571072
Insurance Law
are essentially the same as under the Stowers doctrine.40 Accordingly,
having found no Stowers violation, the court granted summary judgment
for Gulf on Blum's Article 21.21 claim.41
E. COURT FINDS ARTICLE 21.55 APPLIES TO PAYMENT OF DEFENSE
COSTS UNDER LIABILITY POLICY
The Southern District of Texas addressed whether damages under In-
surance Code Article 21.55 would be appropriate in a third-party liability
action in Luxury Living, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Casualty Co.42 Luxury
Living sought defense and indemnification under a commercial general
liability ("CGL") policy issued by Mid-Continent. Mid-Continent denied
coverage and Luxury Living filed a declaratory action. Luxury Living
also alleged that it was entitled to damages under Article 21.55 for Mid-
Continent's failure to provide a defense. Mid-Continent argued that Lux-
ury Living was not entitled to Article 21.55 damages because this was a
third-party liability claim, not a first-party claim. Article 21.55 applies
only to first-party claims. 43 Recognizing that Texas case law is not unani-
mous on this issue, the court stated that "most courts in Texas have con-
cluded that a 'claim for the duty to defend is a first party claim asserted
against [the insurer] under Article 21.55 of the Texas Insurance Code, and
the statutory penalty will apply to such sums.' ,,44
II. CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY
A. MOLD CLAIMS UNDER HOMEOWNERS POLICIES
1. Mold Exclusion
In Fiess v. State Farm Lloyds,4 5 United States Magistrate Judge Marcia
A. Crone, in the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division, deter-
mined that the mold exclusion in a standard Texas homeowner's policy
precluded coverage for the homeowners' mold claim.46 After discovering
mold in their home, Richard and Stephanie Fiess made a claim under
their homeowner's insurance policy with State Farm Lloyds. The mold
resulted at least in part from water intrusion into the home. "State Farm
maintain[ed] that the Fiesses' claim for mold damage was expressly ex-
cluded from coverage under the policy. The Fiesses, however, assert[ed]
that the mold damage was covered as an 'ensuing loss' under the Pol-
40. Gulf, 2003 WL 22208551 at *9 ("The Rocor court adopted the common-law Stow-
ers standard in determining the statutory liability standard [under article 21.21 post
Head].").
41. Id. at *10.
42. Luxury Living, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., No. CIV.A.H-02-3166, 2003 WL
22116202 (S.D. Tex. Sep. 10, 2003).
43. Id. at *20 (quoting art. 21.55 § 1(3)).
44. Id. (quoting Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v. Steve Roberts Custom Builders, Inc., 215 F.
Supp. 2d 783, 794 (E.D. Tex. 2002)) (alterations in original).
45. Fiess v. State Farm Lloyds, No. CIV.A.H-02-1912, 2003 WL 21659408 (S.D. Tex.
June 4, 2003).
46. Id. at *9.
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icy."' 47 The policy provided:
f. We [State Farm] do not cover loss caused by:
(1) wear and tear, deterioration or loss caused by an quality in
property that causes it to damage or destroy itself.
(2) rust, rot, mold or other fungi.
(3) dampness of atmosphere, extremes of temperature.
(4) contamination.
(5) rats, mice, termites, moths or other insects.
We do cover ensuing loss caused by collapse of building or any part
of the building, water damage or breakage of glass which is part of
the building if the loss would otherwise be covered under the
policy.48
The court determined that this exclusion explicitly removed from cov-
erage any loss caused by mold, regardless of the cause of the mold. How-
ever, the Fiesses argued that their mold damage fell within the "exception
to the exclusion as an 'ensuing loss caused by ... water damage' under
the Policy."'49 The court found that "'ensuing loss caused by ... water
damage' refers to water damage which is the result, rather than the cause,
of one of the types of damage enumerated in [the] exclusion ... in this
case mold."'50 The court noted that the "opinion relied upon by the
Fiesses, Home Ins. Co. v. McClain,51 . . .departs from the long line of
authority in Texas and is contrary to the interpretation given the ensuing
loss clause in other jurisdictions. ' 52 Because it was undisputed that the
water damage was not caused by the mold, but instead, the mold was
caused by the water damage, the court held that the mold damage was
excluded and did not fall within the ensuing loss exception.53
In Flores v. Allstate Texas Lloyd's Co.,54 United States District Judge
Crane, for the Southern District of Texas, McAllen Division, reached the
opposite conclusion from the Fiess decision. Like Fiess, this case involved
mold claims submitted by homeowners Oscar and Graciela Flores under
a Texas standard homeowners policy. The policy contained the same
mold exclusion and ensuing loss exception as the policy addressed in
Fiess. The court expressly declined to follow the reasoning of the Fiess
case and, instead, concluded that mold damage is covered if it ensues
from an otherwise covered loss under the Policy.55




51. Home Ins. Co. v. McClain, No. 05-97-01479-CV, 2000 WL 144115, at *3 (Tex.
App.-Dallas Feb. 10, 2000, no pet.) (not designated for publication).
52. Fiess, 2003 WL 21659408, at *9.
53. Id.
54. Flores v. Allstate Tex. Lloyd's Co., 278 F. Supp. 2d 810 (S.D. Tex. 2003).




After determining that the Floreses' mold claim was not excluded by
the mold exclusion, the court addressed Allstate's argument that the
Floreses failed to comply with the notice requirement in the policy, which
required prompt written notice in the event of loss to covered property.
The court recognized that Texas follows the manifestation trigger of cov-
erage for property damage claims; that is, "[u]nder Texas law, a party
cannot be said to sustain actual property damage until such damage be-
comes manifest."' 56 The Floreses did not submit a claim for the initial
water event, only for the subsequent mold damage. The court stated that
"there can be no duty to notify until damage is apparent. ' 57 The court
further stated that:
[A] homeowner cannot sit back and watch mold grow in his home, or
observe an obvious mold-instigating event-such as the flooding of a
room in which the baseboards and walls are saturated for several
days, or a continuous leak that saturates a surface-and not notify
his insurers. But not every water event will cause mold to ensue.
Consequently, an insured is not expected to notify his insurance
company each time the toilet overflows or the sink drips, where the
insured takes prompt remedial action appropriate to the
circumstances. 58
The court next considered whether an insurer is required to demon-
strate prejudice in order to avoid coverage under the notice requirement
of a homeowner's policy. The court acknowledged that the Fifth Circuit
has recognized "a 'trend' toward Texas courts requiring a showing of
prejudice to prevail in untimely notice cases, [but] no Texas cases have
yet held that such demonstration of prejudice is required in homeowner's
policies."' 59 As a result, the court declined to impose a prejudice
requirement. 60
Interestingly, in determining the late notice issue, the court did not
take a single manifestation approach. Instead, the court found that cov-
erage was precluded for a portion of the mold damage because there was
sufficient summary judgment evidence that the Floreses were aware of
this damage, but unreasonably delayed reporting the damage to Allstate.
However, with respect to the rest of the mold damage in the house, the
court found that fact questions existed with respect to whether the
Floreses' were sufficiently aware of that damage such that they were obli-
gated to report it to Allstate earlier.61
56. Id. (citing Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Unitramp Ltd., 146 F.3d 311, 313 (5th Cir.
1998)).
57. Id. at 816.
58. Id.
59. Id. (footnote omitted).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 817-20.
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B. LIABILITY COVERAGE FOR CONSTRUCTION DEFECTS-THE
"OCCURRENCE" DEBATE
Insurers, insureds, and courts continue to struggle with analyzing cov-
erage for construction defect claims under general liability policies. Lux-
ury Living, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Casualty Co.,62 and Jim Johnson
Homes, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Casualty Co.,63 are two examples from the
Survey period of how courts struggling with this analysis can reach incon-
sistent conclusions. The difficulty in analyzing coverage for construction
defect cases under Texas jurisprudence generally involves the "occur-
rence" requirement of general liability policies.
Both Luxury Living and Jim Johnson involve claims against home
builders for faulty construction. In Luxury Living, purchasers of a cus-
tom home built by Luxury Living noticed substantial problems with the
home several years after the home was completed. The problems with
the home included "significant areas of water penetration around doors,
windows, and other locations, including a large accumulation of water in
the crawl space under the House." 64 The homeowners asserted causes of
action against Luxury Living "for negligence, negligent misrepresenta-
tion, violations of RCLA, breach of express warranty, breach of implied
warranty of merchantability, breach of implied warranty of good and
workmanlike construction, breach of warranty of habitability, violations
of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and fraud."
65
Luxury Living's insurer, Mid-Continent, denied coverage for the claim,
contending that the claim did not involve property damage caused by an
"occurrence" and that the claim was excluded by several business risk
exclusions in the policy. Luxury Living then sued Mid-Continent for de-
fense costs and indemnity for the claim. Mid-Continent argued that the
liability policy is not a performance bond meant to guarantee that the
insured did the job correctly, rather, the risk that the workmanship may
be faulty and will require repairs to a business risk that should be borne
by the insured rather than a general liability insurer. Mid-Continent ar-
gued that the claim did not constitute an "occurrence," which is defined
under the policy as an accident, because the claim was based on "harm to
the insured's own work caused by the insured's failure to do his job prop-
erly."'66 Luxury Living, on the other hand, argued that Mid-Continent
owed a defense obligation because the claim included "a garden-variety
negligence claim that contains factual allegations of damages which were
undesigned and unexpected by Luxury Living," and which constitutes an
accident and, therefore, an "occurrence. '67
62. Luxury Living, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., No. CIV.A.H-02-3166, 2003 WL
22116202 (S.D. Tex. Sep. 10, 2003).
63. Jim Johnson Homes, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 244 F. Supp. 2d 706 (N.D.
Tex. 2003).
64. Luxury Living, 2003 WL 22116202 at *1.
65. Id. at *3.




The court's analysis addresses numerous court opinions addressing the
"occurrence" issue under Texas law and attempts to harmonize these va-
rying decisions. In the end, the court simply concludes that the "general
allegations of negligence" by the homeowners constituted allegations of
property damages caused by an accident.68 The court did not directly
address Mid-Continent's argument that general liability policies are not
intended to guarantee the quality of the insured's work.
In contrast, the court in Jim Johnson rejected the concept that the mere
assertion of a general negligence theory as an alternative basis of recov-
ery is sufficient to satisfy the "occurrence" requirement of a general lia-
bility policy.6 9 The underlying claim in Jim Johnson arose from a
construction contract between the Jeters and Jim Johnson, pursuant to
which the Jeters hired Jim Johnson to build them a custom home. During
the construction of the home, the Jeters encountered problems with the
construction work, including problems with the foundation. After a dis-
pute arose between the Jeters and Jim Johnson over the problems with
the construction, the Jeters terminated the contract with Jim Johnson and
stopped the construction project. Ultimately, it was determined that the
foundation was defective and, as a result, the entire foundation and the
partial framing that had been constructed had to be demolished so that
the foundation could be rebuilt. The Jeters sued Jim Johnson for "(1)
breach of contract, (2) violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices
Act, and (3) fraud."'70 Alternatively, the Jeters alleged that "[Jim John-
son] ... was negligent in [(1)] designing and constructing [the home, and
in] [(2)] retaining, employing and supervising its designers, employees,
engineers and subcontractors. '71
The Jim Johnson court held that that the Jeter's claim was not covered
under Jim Johnson's general liability policy. The court noted that "as a
general proposition, the purpose of comprehensive liability insurance
coverage for a builder is to protect the insured from liability resulting
from property damage (or bodily injury) caused by the insured's product,
but not for the replacement or repair of that product. ' 72 The court also
suggested that the "better reasoned authorities hold that claims such as
the Jeters are making ... are not claims of accidental damage to prop-
erty."'73 The court determined that "there is no reading of ... any Texas
court decision the court has found that reasonably would lead to a con-
clusion that the mere characterization, alternatively made, that a contrac-
tor's failure to properly perform a building contract was negligent is
sufficient to convert claims based on breach of express and implied cove-
nants and warranties in a building contract into a claim for recovery of
68. Id. at *16
69. Jim Johnson Homes, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 244 F. Supp. 2d 706, 716
(N.D. Tex. 2003).
70. Id. at 711.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 715.
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property damages caused by an accident within the meaning of a liability
insurance policy."'74
While the factual distinctions and analytical nuances involved in Lux-
ury Living and Jim Johnson will likely be debated by insureds and insur-
ers in future coverage disputes as each attempts to support its respective
position, these cases demonstrate the need for the Texas Supreme Court
to articulate more definitive guidelines for determining whether a con-
struction defect case involves allegations of property damage caused by
an "occurrence." Without a more clearly defined rule, insureds and in-
surers (such as Mid-Continent in these two cases) potentially face con-
flicting interpretations of their insurance policies.
C. SCOPE OF AUTO EXCLUSION NOT LIMITED BY "SEPARATION OF
INSUREDS" CLAUSE
In Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Maxey,75 the Houston Court of Ap-
peals, First District, analyzed whether the "separation of insureds" clause,
also called the severability clause, limits the scope of the automobile ex-
clusion in a general liability policy. In this case, two companies, L&R
Timber Co., Inc. ("L&R") and Triple L Express, Inc. ("Triple L"), were
insured under the same CGL policy. Employees of both companies were
"insureds" under the policy. An employee of Triple L was involved in an
automobile accident with another motorist while he was operating a
truck. At the time of the accident, the truck the employee was operating
was pulling a trailer owned by L&R. An L&R employee was responsible
for the braking system on the truck, the failure of which appeared to be a
partial cause of the accident. The injured motorist sued Triple L, its em-
ployee, L&R, and its employee. 76
The liability insurer filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to es-
tablish that it did not owe Triple L or L&R a defense or indemnity pursu-
ant to the automobile exclusion in the policy, which excluded coverage
for "'[b]odily injury' or 'property damage' arising out of the ownership,
maintenance, use or entrustment to others of any... 'auto'... owned or
operated by or rented or loaned to any insured. '7 7 The policy contained
a severability clause which provided that the insurance applies "[a]s if
each Named Insured were the only Named Insured; and... separately to
each insured against whom claim is made or 'suit' is brought. '78
"The severability clause serves to provide coverage when there is an
'innocent' insured who did not commit the conduct excluded by the pol-
icy."' 7 9 Thus, the issue before the court was whether the severability pro-
vision limited the scope of the auto exclusion to only those damages
74. Id. at 716 n.13.
75. Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Maxey, 110 S.W.3d 203 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
2003, pet. denied).
76. Id. at 207.
77. Id. at 209.




attributable to the specific insured seeking coverage. In addressing this
issue of first impression,80 the court noted that in King v. Dallas Fire In-
surance Co.,81 the Texas Supreme Court applied the severability clause to
an expected or intended injury exclusion which excluded coverage for
injury expected or intended from the standpoint of "the insured."' 82 The
Bituminous court found it significant that the auto exclusion applied to
autos owned or operated by or rented or loaned to "any insured."83 The
court refused to apply the severability clause to the auto exclusion, noting
that "to hold that the term 'any insured' in an exclusion means 'the in-
sured making the claim' would collapse the distinction between the terms
'the insured' and 'any insured' in an insurance policy exclusion clause,
making the distinction meaningless.' 84 Accordingly, the court held that
coverage was precluded by the auto exclusion. 85
D. ANTITRUST CLAIM BARRED BY FORTUITY DocrRINE
In RLI Insurance Co. v. Maxxon Southwest, Inc.,86 the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Texas refused to find coverage
under a commercial general liability policy for antitrust claims involving
alleged conduct beginning prior to the purchase of the policy. The court
decision was based on the principle enunciated by the Southern District
that a party "may not 'voluntarily engag[e] in an activity that gives rise to
an accusation of wrongdoing and potential legal liability, and then
purchas[e] insurance so that it may shift financial responsibility for its
conduct. '87
Maxxon Southwest, Inc. ("MSI"), Gypsum Floors, Raymond Brekke,
and the Maxxon Corporation were sued "for violations of the Robinson-
Patman Act and conspiracy to violate federal antitrust laws" based on
their establishment of a discriminatory pricing scheme to gain a price ad-
vantage over the competition.88 The allegations stated that this began
before 1996. RLI had issued a CGL policy to MSI, Gypsum Floors, and
Brekke for the first time on or before April 1, 2000 and the policy was in
effect between April 1, 2000 and April 1, 2001. The underlying defend-
ants sought a defense from RLI, who undertook the defense at first, but
later withdrew. RLI then sought a declaratory judgment in this action
that it had no duty to defend. "RLI argue[d] that the activities alleged in
80. Id. at 211 ("This is apparently a case of first impression under Texas law regarding
the application of a separation of insureds clause to a policy provision that refers to 'any
insured."').
81. King v. Dallas Fire Ins. Co., 85 S.W.3d 185 (Tex. 2002).
82. Bituminous Cas. Corp., 110 S.W.3d at 212 (citing King, 85 S.W.3d at 188) (empha-
sis added).
83. Id. at 211.
84. Id. at 214.
85. Id. at 215.
86. RLI Ins. Co. v. Maxxon Southwest, Inc., 265 F. Supp. 2d 727 (N.D. Tex. 2003).
87. Id. at 730 (quoting Franklin v. Fugro-McClelland (Southwest), Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d
732, 736 (S.D. Tex. 1997)).
88. Id. at 728.
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the underlying complaint constituted a 'loss in progress,' which [pre-
cluded] coverage under the fortuity doctrine." 89
The fortuity doctrine precludes insurance coverage "where the insured
is, or should be, aware of an ongoing progressive loss or known loss at the
time the policy is purchased." 90 The doctrine is based on "the premise
that, because insurance policies are designed to insure against fortuities,
insuring a certainty constitutes fraud." 9 1 The court stated that
[t]he key factor in determining coverage under the fortuity doctrine
is not, as defendants contend, whether the insureds had actual
knowledge of the underlying loss and potential liability . . . but
rather if they knew at the inception of coverage "that they were en-
gaging in activities for which they could possibly be found liable."'92
The court determined that the risk of potential injury to their competition
due to the formulation of price lists was or should have been apparent.93
Thus, the fortuity doctrine precluded MSI, Gypsum, and Bekke from re-
ceiving coverage and, consequently, a defense from RLI. 94
E. COMPETING OTHER INSURANCE CLAUSES-THE
INDEMNITY EXCEPTION
American Indemnity Lloyds v. Travelers Property & Casualty Insurance
Co.95 involved a dispute between two liability insurers regarding the ap-
plication of their respective other insurance clauses. In resolving the is-
sue, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized an exception to the
general rule that conflicting other insurance clauses in multiple liability
policies covering the same loss are to be disregarded and the co-insurers
are to share the loss. In this case, Elite Masonry, Inc. ("Elite") agreed to
provide masonry services pursuant to a subcontract with Caddell Con-
struction Company, Inc. ("Caddell"), the general contractor. Under the
subcontract, Elite agreed to indemnify Caddell for all claims, demands,
liabilities, losses, expenses, suits, and actions for or on account of injuries
arising out of the work done in connection with the subcontract. The
subcontract further required Elite to procure liability insurance naming
Caddell as an additional insured. Elite obtained the required insurance
from American Indemnity Lloyds ("AIL") with primary limits of
$1,000,000. Caddell was also the named insured under its own general
liability insurance policy issued by Aetna Casualty & Surety Company
(subsequently assumed by Travelers Property & Casualty Ins.
89. Id. at 729.
90. Id. at 730 (quoting Two Pesos, Inc. v. Gulf Ins. Co., 901 S.W.2d 495, 501 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no writ) (citations omitted in original)).
91. Id. (citing Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Travis, 68 S.W.3d 72, 75 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2001,
pet. denied)).
92. Id. at 731 (quoting Franklin v. Fugro-McClelland (Southwest), Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d
732, 736 (S.D. Tex. 1997)).
93. Id. at 732.
94. Id.
95. Am. Indem. Lloyds v. Travelers Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 335 F.3d 429 (5th Cir. 2003).
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Co.)("TPC") with primary limits of $1,000,000. Both policies contained
identical other insurance clauses. 96
An employee of Elite sued Elite and Caddell for injuries he received
while performing work pursuant to Elite's subcontract with Caddell.
Caddell's insurer, TPC, initially provided Caddell with a defense, but sub-
sequently withdrew when AIL assumed Caddell's defense in response to
a demand by TPC. AIL ultimately settled the lawsuit. AIL demanded
that TPC reimburse it for a portion of the settlement and defense costs,
but TPC refused. AIL filed a declaratory judgment action against TPC
seeking a declaration that it was entitled under the "other insurance"
clauses of the policies to recover from TPC half of the amount paid to
settle and defend Caddell.97
The court acknowledged the general rule that
[W]here each of two liability insurance policies issued by different
insurers provides primary coverage to the same insured in respect to
the claim in question and contains mutually consistent 'other insur-
ance' provisions similar to those in the policies here, the insurer pay-
ing more than its share (generally either one half or the fraction that
the limits of its policy is of the total of the limits of both policies) of
the claim is ordinarily entitled to recover from the other insurer for
the excess so paid. 98
However, the court found that this "general rule is subject to an equally
widely recognized exception for cases in which the policy of the insurer
seeking to invoke the 'other insurance' clauses also covers another in-
sured who is liable to indemnify the insured in the policy of the other
insurer." 99 This rule is based on the "potential circuity of action" that
would potentially result in "wasteful litigation." 10 0 For example, in this
case, had TPC been required to reimburse AIL for half of the settlement
and defense costs, TPC, standing in the shoes of its insured, Caddell, pre-
sumably would have asserted a subrogation claim against Elite, AIL's in-
sured, for contractual indemnity under the subcontract and AIL
ultimately would have been required to defend and indemnify Elite
against this claim. In that event, the result would have been the same:
AIL would have borne all the costs of defending and settling the claim.
F. CGL COVERAGE B-"PERSONAL INJURY" AND "ADVERTISING
INJURY" COVERAGE
1. No Coverage for Patent Infringement
In Pennsylvania Pulp & Paper Co. v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance
96. Id. at 432.
97. Id. at 431-34.
98. Id. at 435.
99. Id. at 436.




Co.,101 the Houston Court of Appeals, Fourteenth District, determined
that a patent infringement claim was not covered under a CGL policy's
coverage for "advertising injury," which is defined as "injury arising out
of one or more of the following offenses:... [m]isappropriation of adver-
tising ideas or style of doing business."'1 02 In this case, the insured sued
the manufacturer of holographic imaging machines alleging breach of
contract and violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act
("DTPA"). The manufacturer filed a counterclaim alleging, among other
things, patent infringement, misappropriation of trade secrets, and
groundless DTPA claims.10 3
The court determined that because the manufacturer did not allege any
facts related to, or injury from, advertising activity, the claim did not fall
within the policy's advertising injury coverage.1 04
2. No Coverage for Counterclaim of Groundless D TPA Claim
As stated above, the manufacturer's counterclaim also sought damages
for the insured's alleged filing of a groundless DTPA claim. The insured
argued that this claim fell within the policy's "personal injury" coverage,
which expressly included coverage for malicious prosecution, but did not
define "malicious prosecution." The insured argued that the DTPA coun-
terclaim was covered because it constituted "malicious prosecution.' 0 5
However, the court disagreed, holding that this term referred to the spe-
cific legal claim of malicious prosecution under the Texas common law
and was intended to have the technical meaning and elements of that
claim as provided under the common law. 10 6
3. Courts Disagree Over Whether Insurer Must Demonstrate Prejudice
To Deny Coverage for "Personal Injury" Claims Based on
Late Notice
Two Federal District Courts in Texas addressed the issue of whether a
CGL insurer must show prejudice in order to deny coverage for "per-
sonal injury" claims based on the insured's failure to provide timely no-
tice in accordance with the policy.10 7 However, the courts reached
opposite conclusions.
St. Paul Guardian Insurance Co. v. Centrum G.S. Ltd. involved a suit
against an insured building owner by a former employee, Perdue, for va-
rious causes of action arising out of an allegedly wrongful termination.
101. Pa. Pulp & Paper Co., Inc. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 100 S.W.3d 566 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied).
102. Id. at 568-69 (quoting the policy).
103. Id. at 569.
104. Id. at 575.
105. Id. at 573.
106. Id. at 575.
107. See St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co. v. Centrum G.S. Ltd., No. CIV.A. 3:97CV1478-L,
2003 WL 22038321 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2003); New Era of Networks, Inc. v. Great N. Ins.
Co., No. H-01-1841, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14259 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 1, 2003).
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The insurer filed a declaratory judgment action against the insured seek-
ing a judicial determination that it has no duty to defend or indemnify the
insured or any other defendant in the action and that the insured's late
notice of Perdue's claims and suit relieved it of its obligations under the
CGL policy.10 8
First, the insurer argued that the terms of the policy itself do not re-
quire a showing of prejudice because the prejudice requirement was lim-
ited to "bodily injury" and "property damage" claims.10 9 They argued
that "personal injury" liability is not mentioned in the clause requiring
prejudice, thus they can, by implication, deny coverage for a personal in-
jury claim because of late notice without showing prejudice. 110 The court
disagreed, stating that the "policy [did] not expressly state that the
prejudice requirement applie[d] only to bodily injury and property dam-
age claims" and that such an interpretation "would render the insurance
policy ambiguous.""' 1 The court determined that the insurer had the
duty to set forth expressly and in unambiguous terms the circumstances
under which forfeiture of coverage for personal injury claims would oc-
cur, but failed to do so. As such, it could not manipulate the policy and
argue that the policy did not require the insurer to show prejudice. 112
Furthermore, the court interpreted the Fifth Circuit's decision in Han-
son Production Co. v. Americas Insurance Co. and concluded that insur-
ance companies cannot "deny coverage on the basis of untimely notice
under [a CGL] 'occurrence' policy unless [they] can show actual prejudice
from the delay." 113 The court refused to accept the insurer's argument
that Hanson's prejudice requirement was limited to claims for bodily in-
jury and property damage under a general liability policy based on prece-
dent holding that the impact untimely notice has on coverage depends on
the type of insurance policy issued, not on the type of coverage provided
under the policy. 114
The insurer argued that it was prejudiced by the late notice because it
lost the opportunity to investigate the case and to manage the defense for
eighteen to twenty-four months and that it lost the opportunity to partici-
pate in early settlement negotiations and obtain a settlement for less than
$20,000. The court disagreed, finding that no Texas case has held that an
insurer's inability or failure to obtain a smaller or more favorable settle-
ment constitutes prejudice sufficient to relieve an insurer of its duty to
defend or indemnify its insured. 11 5 Therefore, the court found that there
108. Centrum, 2003 WL 22038321 at *2.




113. Id. at *7 (citing Matador Petroleum Corp. v. St. Paul Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 174
F.3d 653, 678 (5th Cir. 1999)).
114. Id. at *6-8.
115. Id. at *9. The court noted that there were only four circumstances where courts
have in fact found prejudice as a result of late notice: (1) when the insurer receives notice
after entry of default judgment against the insured; (2) where the insurer receives notice of
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was no prejudice as a result of the late notice.116
However, the Southern District of Texas addressed the prejudice re-
quirement for the late notice of "personal injury" claims and came to a
different determination in New Era.117 This case involved a trademark
infringement case against an insured for the use of the name "NEON."
The insured sought coverage for the claim under its CGL and umbrella
policies that provided coverage for personal injuries and advertising
injuries. 118
The court found that the decision in Hanson requiring a showing of
prejudice to the insurer in order to deny coverage for late notice of claims
was limited to claims for bodily injury or property damage liability and,
thus, insurers issuing a CGL policy do not have to show prejudice to deny
coverage for claims of advertising injuries due to a late notice of the
claim.119 The court also held that an insurer was not precluded from rais-
ing a late notice defense because they would deny coverage anyway for
claims such as "prior acts, first publication, fortuity, known loss, or loss in
progress.' 20
G. TEXAS SUPREME COURT RECOGNIZES BROAD MEANING OF
"ARISING OUT OF"
In Utica National Insurance Co. of Texas v. American Indemnity Co.,1 2 1
the Texas Supreme Court addressed the scope of a professional liability
exclusion in a CGL policy, which excluded coverage for "'bodily in-
jury' . . . due to rendering or failure to render any professional service"' 22
The court declined to read the exclusion as broadly as the insurer pro-
posed, instead finding that the exclusion applied "only when the ... in-
jury is caused by the breach of a professional standard of care."'1 23
Significant to the court's analysis was the use of the phrase "due to" in
the exclusion rather than the broader phrase "arising out of," which was
used in other parts of the policy.' 24
Because the phrase "arising out of" is frequently used in almost all
types of insurance policies, the court's comments regarding this phrase
are noteworthy. The court stated that "'aris[ing] out of' means that there
is simply a 'causal connection or relation,' which is interpreted to mean
the suit and the trial date is so close to that date that it deprives the insurer of an opportu-
nity to investigate the claims or mount an adequate defense; (3) the insurer receives notice
after trial and judgment against the insured; and (4) when the insurer receives notice of a
default judgment against the insured after it has become final and non-appealable. Id.
116. Id. at *11.
117. New Era of Networks, Inc. v. Great N. Ins. Co., No. H-01-1841, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14239 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 1, 2003).
118. Id. at *2-8.
119. Id. at *14-22.
120. Id. at *24 (citation omitted).
121. Utica Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Am. Indem. Co., No. 02-0090, 2003 WL 21468776 (Tex. June
26, 2003), reh'g granted (Dec. 19, 2003).
122. Id. at *2 (emphasis added).




that there is but-for causation, though not necessarily direct or proximate
causation.' 12 5 Since the policy provision at issue used the phrase "due
to," rather than "arising out of," the court concluded that a more direct
type of causation was required. 126
H. AUTO POLICIES: No COVERAGE FOR "DIMINISHED VALUE"
AFTER REPAIRS
During the 2002 Survey period, several cases were decided by Texas
appellate courts addressing the issue of whether a standard automobile
policy provides coverage for the diminished value of a covered auto after
the automobile has been fully repaired. These decisions perpetuated a
preexisting split in Texas authority on this issue. 127 During the 2003 Sur-
vey period, the Texas Supreme Court finally resolved this issue in Ameri-
can Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Schaefer.128
In Schaefer, the policyholder submitted a claim under his Texas Stan-
dard Personal Auto Policy for damage to his covered automobile sus-
tained in an automobile accident. The insurer elected to repair the
vehicle and the insured did not dispute the quality or adequacy of these
repairs, but maintained that the value of the automobile decreased by
$2,600 due to market perceptions that a damaged and subsequently re-
paired vehicle is worth less than one that has never been damaged. 129
Thus, the insured sought the diminished value of the car under the policy
and filed suit claiming that the insurer's "refusal to compensate him for
his vehicle's diminished market value violated the Texas Insurance Code
and breached the insurance contract. '130
The court determined "that the policy's plain language... [was] unam-
biguous and [did] not require payment for diminished value when [the]
vehicle has been fully and adequately repaired.' 31 First, the "Limit of
Liability" section of the policy limited the insurer's liability "to the dam-
aged vehicle's 'actual cash value' or the amount needed 'to repair or re-
place' the vehicle, whichever is less.' 32 The court noted that "repair"
means something tangible such as the removal of dents or replacing or
fixing parts, but did not include compensation "for the market's percep-
tion that a damaged but fully and adequately repaired vehicle has an in-
125. Id. (citation omitted).
126. Id.
127. Compare Schaefer v. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 65 S.W.3d 806, 808-10 (Tex. App.-
Beaumont 2002), rev'd 124 S.W.3d 154 (Tex. 2003) (finding that the policy provided cover-
age for diminished value) and Bailey v. Progressive County Mut. Ins. Co., 78 S.W.3d 708,
710-11 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2002), rev'd No. 02-0778, 2004 WL 326707 (finding that the
policy provided coverage for diminished value) with Smither v. Progressive County Mut.
Ins. Co., 76 S.W.3d 719, 725 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied) (finding
that the policy did not provide coverage for diminished value).
128. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 124 S.W.3d 154 (Tex. 2003).
129. Id. at 156.
130. Id.




trinsic value less than that of a never-damaged car."'133
Second, the court determined that to interpret "repair or replace lan-
guage to include diminished value ... would render other provisions of
the policy meaningless.' 34 For example, the language of the policy stat-
ing that the insured is entitled to "the lesser of" actual cash value or the
cost to repair or replace the vehicle would be rendered meaningless if the
court allowed diminished value damages because insurer would have to
pay both to repair or replace the car and pay the cash value of the car
under Schaefer's interpretation, thus undermining the insurer's option to
choose the appropriate compensation. Also, the "Payment of Loss" pro-
vision that allows the insurer to pay loss in money or repair or replace-
ment would be rendered meaningless by requiring the insurer to pay
diminished value because it would turn those "ors" into "ands."'1 35
Third, the court determined that the language of the "Limitation of
Liability provision" of the policy referring to the "[a]mount necessary to
repair or replace the property with other of like kind and quality" does
not require the insurer to pay diminished value, but means that if the
insurer elects to repair a vehicle, it must do so using parts of like kind and
quality, or if the insurer elects to replace the vehicle, it must do so with a
vehicle of like kind and quality.' 36
Finally, the court rejected Schaefer's argument that the policy covers
diminished-value damages because it is not expressly included in the "Ex-
clusions" section of the policy. The court stated, "Absence of an exclu-
sion cannot confer coverage.' 37 The policy language did not require
coverage for diminished value to begin with, so an exclusion was not
necessary. 138
Thus, the court determined that an automobile insurer was not re-
quired to pay for the diminished value of the automobile. 39
I. COVERAGE FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES NOT AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY
During this Survey period, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals and the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Abilene
Division, concluded that coverage for punitive damages under liability
policies does not violate Texas public policy.' 40 These decisions contra-
dict an earlier opinion from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas. 141
133. Id. at 158-59.
134. Id. at 159.
135. Id. at 159-60.
136. Id. at 160.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 162.
140. Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Admiral Ins. Co., No. 2-01-227-CV, 2003 WL 21475423
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth, Jun. 26, 2003), reh'g granted (Sept. 22, 2003); Fairfield Ins. Co. v.
Stephens Martin Paving, L.P, No. CIV.A. 1:03-CV-037-C, 2003 WL 22005877 (N.D. Tex.
Aug. 25, 2003).
141. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Powell, 19 F. Supp. 2d 678 (N.D. Tex. 1998).
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In Westchester Fire Insurance Co. v. Admiral Insurance Co.,1 42 the Fort
Worth Court of Appeals determined that punitive damages were covered
under a liability policy and that such coverage did not violate public pol-
icy. This case involved claims under primary and excess professional lia-
bility policies for a malpractice claim against the insured nursing home.
At a bench trial on the underlying claims, the court granted the complain-
ant compensatory damages, prejudgment interest, mental anguish dam-
ages, and treble damages, but before the court could determine punitive
damages, the insured settled the suit with the claimants "for an amount
exceeding the [claimants'] compensatory damages. ' 143 The primary in-
surer tendered its policy limits, less defense costs and the insured's de-
ductible, leaving the excess insurer to contribute the remaining amount.
After this, the excess insurer filed suit against the primary insurer for
negligent failure "to settle the claimants' claims against the insured within
the limits of the primary insurance policy.' 14
4
The court addressed the trial court's summary judgment issue of
whether insurance coverage for punitive damages is considered void as
against public policy. They noted that "[n]either the Texas Legislature
nor the Supreme Court of Texas has addressed whether insurance cover-
age for punitive damages violates the public policy of Texas. 1 45 In a pre-
vious decision, the Northern District of Texas made an "Erie guess" as to
how the Texas Supreme Court would resolve the issue, "hold[ing] that, at
least in the context of third-party coverage for automobile insurance
claims, insurance coverage for punitive damages [was] void as against
public policy.' 46 Because this case was not binding precedent, the court
continued its analysis, examining the various policy sources in this con-
text. The court noted that several cases providing coverage for "sums" or
"all sums" an insured becomes required to pay as a result of bodily injury
or property damages covers punitive damages if not otherwise ex-
cluded. 1 4 7 Beginning in 1994, Texas courts of appeals began to move
towards considering insurance coverage for punitive damages as void
against public policy specifically in the context of uninsured motorist
claims. However, the court noted that those decisions were based on the
fact that the aims of punitive damages in Texas, punishment and deter-
rence, were not involved in uninsured motorist cases since the wrongdoer
was not even present in the case, which is consistent with other courts
that held insurance coverage for punitive damages is void as against pub-
lic policy because "wrongdoers should not be shielded from the conse-
quences of their acts.' 1 48
The Insurance Code has specifically addressed "coverage for punitive
142. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 2003 WL 21475423.
143. Id. at *1.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. (discussing Hartford, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 696).




damages under professional medical liability policies. ' 14 9 In 1977, the
legislature [inserted a clause] which provided that [n]o policy ... [could]
include coverage for punitive damages.., against [a] health care provider
or physician." 150 At that time, the definition of "health care provider"
did not include for-profit nursing homes. The legislature amended these
provisions in 1987 to allow endorsements providing "coverage for puni-
tive damages to be used on a policy of medical professional liability insur-
ance issued to a hospital.' 151 "The legislature extended the ability to
obtain an endorsement for punitive damages to not-for-profit nursing
homes in 1997. '1t 52 In 2001, the legislature added for-profit nursing
homes to the list of entities prohibiting coverage for punitives under a
primary insurance policy and the list allowing an endorsement granting
coverage for punitive damages. Thus, the court noted that, under the cur-
rent law, a "for-profit nursing home ... may not obtain insurance cover-
age for punitive damage awards under a professional medical liability
insurance policy unless the nursing home specifically obtains an endorse-
ment for such coverage. ' 153 However, those provisions did not apply here
because the events giving rise to the claims occurred between January
and May of 1994 and the case was determined in 1995, before many of
these developments. Also, the court noted that this case is distinguisha-
ble from those cases where the court found coverage for punitive dam-
ages violated public policy because the wrongdoers, here the insured
would still face punishment and deterrence because the payment of puni-
tive damages would be reflected in higher future premiums they would
have to pay their insurers as a result of such payment. Thus, the court
held that coverage for punitive damages under the excess policy was not
void as against public policy. 154
Furthermore, the court found that punitive damages for gross negli-
gence were not precluded as expected or intended injuries because the
court could conceive of acts or omissions which could cause serious harm
that would rise to the level of grossly negligent behavior, thus leading to
punitive damages, but where the actor would "not anticipate or consider
it probable that the harm would actually occur."'1 55
Accordingly, this court held that the trial court had erred in finding
that coverage for punitive damages was void as against public policy
under this policy and that the excess carrier's recovery from the primary
carrier "should not have been limited to amounts attributable to excess
149. Id. at *7 (citing TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.15-1 (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 2003)).
150. Id. (quoting Medical Liability and Insurance Act, 65th Leg., R.S., ch. 817, § 31.01,
1977 Tex. Gen. Laws 2039, 2056 (amended 1987, 1997 & 2001) (current version at TEX. INS.
CODE. ANN. art. 5.15-1, § 8 (Vernon Supp. 2003)).
151. Id. at *81 (quoting Act of June 3, 1987, 70th Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 1, § 7.01, 1987 Tex.
Gen. Laws 1, 36 (amended 1997 & 2001)).
152. Id.
153. Id. at *9.




compensatory damages only."'1 56
In Fairfield Insurance Co. v. Stephens Martin Paving, L.P., the Abilene
Division of the Northern District of Texas determined that coverage for
punitive damages under an employer's liability policy did not violate
Texas public policy.' 5 7 Roy Edward Bennett was an employee of Ste-
phens Martin Paving. On December 20, 2002, while Bennett was acting
in the scope and course of his employment, he died when a brooming
machine he was operating rolled over him. Carrie Bennett, Bennett's
widow, brought suit on January 24, 2003 against Stephens Martin claiming
gross negligence. She alleged in the lawsuit that Stephens Martin "was
aware of the lack of properly functioning seat belts on a brooming ma-
chine which [Bennett] was operating at the time of his death. '158 She
further alleged that Stephens Martin failed to provide properly function-
ing brakes on the brooming machine; failed to assure the mechanical
soundness of the equipment; failed to follow, enforce, and properly train
its employees concerning appropriate safety rules and regulations; and
failed to warn Bennett of the hazards of his employment. Bennett sought
punitive damages in the suit.159
Fairfield Insurance Company issued Stephens Martin a two-part policy:
Part One being a Workers' Compensation Policy and Part Two being an
Employer's Liability Policy. Coverage under the Workers' Compensation
part of the policy was not in question in this decision. The case instead
looked at coverage under the Employer's Liability part of the policy. Ste-
phens Martin sought coverage under this part of the policy. However,
Fairfield argued that there was no coverage in this case seeking declara-
tory judgment regarding the parties' rights under the Employer's Liability
Policy.1 60
Fairfield's first argument was that there was no coverage for Bennett's
gross negligence claims because of an exclusion stating, "[t]his insurance
does not cover . . .bodily injury intentionally caused or aggravated by
you.' 161 The court disagreed, first finding that Bennett's gross negligence
claims based on improper maintenance of brakes and seatbelts, and fail-
ure to enforce industry safeguards and practices presented sufficient
claims to bring forth a duty to defend and to indemnify. They also noted
that Texas courts recognize a difference between intentional misconduct
and gross negligence.' 62 The court quoted Westchester stating that, "a
person could know that an act or commission was likely to cause serious
harm for purposes of gross negligence, but not anticipate it or consider it
156. Id.
157. Fairfield Ins. Co. v. Stephens Martin Paving, L.P., No. CIV.A. 1:03-CV-037-C,
2003 WL 22005877, at *8-10 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 25, 2003).
158. Id. at *1.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at *4 (quoting Part Two-Employers Liability Insurance, at subsections A-C).
162. Id. at *6-8.
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probable that the harm would actually occur.' 1 63 Because of this distinc-
tion, the exclusion did not apply to preclude coverage.1 64
The court next turned to the question of whether the policy could cover
punitive damages under Texas law. They found no specific guidance from
the Texas Supreme Court or the Texas Legislature. However, they turned
to two cases: Ridgway v. Gulf Life Insurance Co.1 65 from the Fifth Circuit
and Westchester166 from the Fort Worth Court of Appeals. In both of
those cases, the courts had held that coverage for punitive damages did
not violate Texas public policy. The courts determined that until the
Texas Supreme Court was willing to change its approach to punitive dam-
ages covered by liability insurance, the cases above were controlling. Ac-
cordingly, the Employer's Liability Policy provided coverage for punitive
damages arising as a result of Stephens Martin's gross negligence. 167
III. SCOPE OF EVIDENCE ADMISSIBLE IN
COVERAGE LITIGATION
In Swicegood v. Medical Protective Co.,168 United States District Judge
Fitzwater for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division, addressed
the issue of the scope of evidence admissible in a coverage trial. Specifi-
cally, the court considered whether the evidence must be limited to evi-
dence introduced during the underlying liability trial or whether new
evidence may be admitted when the underlying liability trial does not
resolve all the coverage issues.169
As a threshold question, the court considered whether the insurer
could be "obligated to indemnify the [insured for the underlying judg-
ment] in the absence.in the judgment or verdict that apportioned or allo-
cated the damages between covered and non-covered claims.' 1 70 The
insurer cited several cases for the proposition that the insured is obligated
to obtain findings in the underlying lawsuit that apportioned or allocated
damages between covered and non-covered claim. However, the court
determined that these cases only stood for "the propositions that the ap-
portionment or allocation must be made at some point and that the judg-
ment or verdict in the underlying suit may in some instances completely
resolve the coverage question.' 171 The court specifically relied on lan-
guage in a Texas Supreme Court decision stating, "[i]t may sometimes be
necessary to defer resolution of indemnity issues until the liability litiga-
163. Id. at *8 (quoting Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Admiral Ins. Co., No. 2-01-227-CV,
2003 WL 21475423, at *13 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Jan. 26, 2003), reh'g granted (Sept. 22,
2003)).
164. Id.
165. Ridgway v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 578 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1978).
166. Westchester, 2003 WL 21475423.
167. Fairfield, 2003 WL 2205877, at *9-10.
168. Swicegood v. Med. Protective Co., No. CIV.A. 3:95-CV-0335-D, 2003 WL
22234928 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 19, 2003).
169. Id. at *11.
170. Id. at *4.
171. Id. at *5.
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tion is resolved. In some cases, coverage may turn on facts actually
proven in the underlying lawsuit."' 72 The court considered the contrast
in these two statements to be significant and determined that coverage
issues that cannot be resolved in the underlying third-party case can be
subject to further factual development in the subsequent coverage
case. 173
Next, the court considered the argument that the insurer was "collater-
ally estopped from contesting coverage because the jury in the underlying
lawsuit allocated or apportioned 100% of the damages to covered mal-
practice claims. 1 74 However, the court determined that there remained
a question of material fact whether the damages are based on conduct
covered under the policy. This collateral estoppel was based on the jury
charge and its use of the terms "negligence" and "ordinary care. 1 75
Nothing in the definitions used by the court limited the jury's considera-
tion to only covered conduct; the jury could have considered evidence of
excluded conduct in reaching its finding of negligence. Furthermore, the
court reasoned that the plaintiff in the underlying lawsuit only had to
establish that the insured's negligence was a proximate cause of her inju-
ries, and that there could have been multiple proximate causes of an
event. The court also noted that that the jury was asked to determine the
amounts that would compensate the plaintiff for injuries "resulting from
the occurrence in question," without defining the term "occurrence in
question. 1 76 Without a definition, the court determined that the term
could mean any event enabling the plaintiff to sue the defendant and, in
this case, the plaintiff relied on both covered and non-covered events.
Based on these determinations, the court held that nothing in the jury's
"charge excluded the possibility of an award of compensatory damages
for non-covered claims. 1 77
Having determined that the underlying lawsuit did not resolve the cov-
erage dispute, the court addressed the scope of the evidence that would
be admissible in the coverage litigation. The court first noted that case
law indicated that "new evidence is admissible [in a coverage trial] when
the coverage question turns on a matter that was not adjudicated in the
liability suit.' 78 The court further stated that it "located no case that
suggests that a coverage suit should consist of a retrial of all or even sub-
stantial parts of an [underlying] indemnity suit that has been fully
tried.1 79 Thus, the court made an "Erie-guess" that the Texas Supreme
Court would hold that new evidence may be introduced in a coverage
trial where such proof is necessary to resolve an issue relevant to cover-
172. Id. at *6 (quoting Farmers Tex. County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 995 S.W.2d 81, 84
(Tex. 1997) (per curiam)).
173. Id. at *6.
174. Id.
175. Id. at *7.
176. Id. at *8.
177. Id.
178. Id. at *12.
179. Id. at *13 (footnote omitted).
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age not conclusively decided in the underlying indemnity suit. However,
the court held "that if the coverage question is one of law that can be
decided on the record of the underlying suit, no new evidence is admissi-
ble.' 180 Applying its "Erie-guess," the court stated that it would admit
"historical evidence from the [u]nderlying [llawsuit and expert testimony
[that would] assist the jury in allocating or apportioning . . . damages"
amongst covered and non-covered conduct.1 81
180. Id. at *14.
181. Id. *15.
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